<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>5</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Magen, Stefan</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Smelser, Neils J.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Baltes, Paul B.</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Philosophy of Law</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The International Encyclopedia of Social and Behavioral Sciences.</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2015</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Elsevier</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kidlington</style></pub-location><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">18</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">24-30</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;A central task of legal philosophy is to provide a general explanation of the normativity of positive law. Legal positivist&lt;br /&gt;
theories pursue this aim primarily by philosophical analyses (linguistic, conceptual, or ontological) that explain law by&lt;br /&gt;
descriptive reference to social practices, mainly of institutional actors. For example, legal validity is explained by a rule of&lt;br /&gt;
recognition, which is a social norm among legal officials. Naturalistic approaches in legal positivism seek a closer contact to&lt;br /&gt;
the social sciences. Natural law theories deny that any explanation of law could succeed without reference to (true) political&lt;br /&gt;
morality.&lt;/p&gt;
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